



Information security manual

Guidelines for networking

Last updated: September 2026

Network design and configuration

Network documentation

It is important that accurate and sufficiently detailed network documentation is developed as this can assist in troubleshooting network problems as well as responding to and recovering from cyber security incidents. As such, network documentation should include high-level network diagrams showing all connections into networks; logical network diagrams showing all critical servers, high-value servers, network devices and network security appliances; and device settings for all critical servers, high-value servers, network devices and network security appliances. Finally, as network documentation could be used by malicious actors to assist in compromising networks, it is important that it is appropriately protected.

Control: ISM-0518; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Network documentation is developed, implemented and maintained.

Control: ISM-0516; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Network documentation includes high-level network diagrams showing all connections into networks and logical network diagrams showing all critical servers, high-value servers, network devices and network security appliances.

Control: ISM-1912; Revision: 0; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Network documentation includes device settings for all critical servers, high-value servers, network devices and network security appliances.

Control: ISM-1178; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Network documentation provided to a third party, or published in public tender documentation, only contains details necessary for other parties to undertake contractual services.

Network segmentation and segregation

Network segmentation and segregation is one of the most effective security controls in preventing malicious actors from easily propagating throughout networks once initial access has been gained. To achieve this, networks can be segregated into multiple network zones to protect servers, services and data. For example, administrative infrastructure used for managing critical servers, high-value servers and regular servers should be segregated from each other. In addition, all administrative infrastructure should be segregated from other assets on networks.

Control: ISM-1181; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Networks are segregated into multiple network zones according to the criticality of servers, services and data.

Control: ISM-1577; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

An organisation's networks are segregated from their service providers' networks.

Using virtual local area networks

Virtual local area networks (VLANs) can be used to implement network segmentation and segregation when networks belong to the same security domain. In such cases, if a data spill occurs the impact will be less than if a data spill occurred between two networks of different classifications or between an organisation's network and public network infrastructure. Should an organisation choose to risk manage implementing VLANs between networks belonging to different security domains, such as at the same classification, additional security controls for network devices will apply, such as not sharing VLAN trunks and terminating VLANs on separate physical network interfaces.

For the purposes of this topic, Multiprotocol Label Switching is considered equivalent to VLANs and subject to the same security controls.

Control: ISM-1532; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

VLANs are not used to separate network traffic between an organisation's networks and public network infrastructure.

Control: ISM-0529; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

VLANs are not used to separate network traffic between networks belonging to different security domains.

Control: ISM-0530; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Network devices managing VLANs are administered from the most trusted security domain.

Control: ISM-0535; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Network devices managing VLANs belonging to different security domains do not share VLAN trunks.

Control: ISM-1364; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Network devices managing VLANs terminate VLANs belonging to different security domains on separate physical network interfaces.

Functional separation between networked devices and the internet

Implementing functional separation between networked devices and the internet reduces the exposure of such devices to attacks originating from the internet.

Control: ISM-2068; Revision: 0; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Internet connectivity for networked devices is strictly limited to those that require access.

Networked management interfaces

To assist in reducing the attack surface of networks, IT equipment residing on networks (such as servers) or constituting the makeup of network infrastructure (such as network devices) should not directly expose their networked management interfaces to the internet. In situations where this is not possible, such as for some cloud services and web applications, alternative measures will need to be implemented to protect weak or vulnerable networked management interfaces from being exploited by malicious actors to

remotely compromise networks. Ideally, IT equipment on networks, or constituting the makeup of network infrastructure, should be managed via a dedicated management network that is segregated from the wider network and the internet.

Control: ISM-1863; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Networked management interfaces for IT equipment are not directly exposed to the internet.

Control: ISM-2160; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Networked management interfaces for IT equipment are only accessible from a dedicated management network that is segregated from the wider network and the internet.

Functional separation between servers

Implementing functional separation between servers reduces the likelihood that a server compromised by malicious actors will pose an increased security risk to other servers.

Control: ISM-0385; Revision: 7; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Servers maintain effective functional separation from each other.

Control: ISM-1479; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Servers minimise communications with other servers at the network and file system level.

Network encryption

While physical security can provide a degree of protection against unauthorised physical access to network infrastructure, unauthorised access to unencrypted data can still be gained via other means, such as compromised network devices. For this reason, all data communicated over network infrastructure should be suitably encrypted, even within appropriately secure areas. As such, it is critical that Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)-approved cryptography is used. However, where protocols do not have encrypted equivalents, an organisation should consider transitioning to alternative protocols that support suitable encryption where practical and feasible.

Control: ISM-1781; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

All data communicated over network infrastructure is encrypted using ASD-approved cryptography.

Using Internet Protocol version 6

The use of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) can introduce additional security risks to networks if not managed appropriately. As such, IPv6 capable network security appliances should be used on IPv6 and dual-stack networks to ensure security coverage equivalent to that provided for Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) networks while assisting in ensuring that IPv6 cannot be exploited by malicious actors.

To aid in the transition from IPv4 to IPv6, numerous tunnelling protocols have been developed to enable interoperability between IPv4 and IPv6. Disabling IPv6 tunnelling protocols on networks that do not require such functionality will prevent malicious actors from bypassing traditional network defences by encapsulating IPv6 data inside IPv4 packets.

Stateless Address Autoconfiguration is a method of stateless Internet Protocol (IP) address configuration in IPv6 networks. It reduces the ability of an organisation to maintain effective logs of IP address assignments on networks. For this reason, stateless IP addressing should be avoided.

Control: ISM-1186; Revision: 4; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

IPv6 capable network security appliances are used on IPv6 and dual-stack networks.

Control: ISM-1428; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Unless explicitly required, IPv6 tunnelling is disabled on all network devices.

Control: ISM-1429; Revision: 4; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

IPv6 tunnelling is blocked by network security appliances at externally connected network boundaries.

Control: ISM-1430; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Dynamically assigned IPv6 addresses are configured with Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 in a stateful manner with lease data stored in a centralised event logging facility.

Network access controls

If malicious actors have reduced opportunities to connect unauthorised network devices, or networked information technology (IT) equipment, to networks, they also have reduced opportunities to compromise such networks. Network access controls can not only prevent unauthorised access to networks, but also prevent personnel from carelessly bridging networks by connecting one network to another network. Furthermore, network access controls can also be useful for limiting the flow of network traffic between network segments.

Control: ISM-0520; Revision: 9; Updated: Dec-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Network access controls are implemented on networks to prevent the connection of unauthorised network devices and networked IT equipment.

Control: ISM-1182; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Network access controls are implemented to limit the flow of network traffic within and between network segments to only that required for business purposes.

802.1X authentication and key exchange

802.1X authentication requires the use of an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), of which multiple EAP methods are available.

Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) is considered one of the most secure EAP methods for 802.1X authentication and is widely supported. It uses a public key infrastructure to secure communications between devices and a Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server by using X.509 certificates. While EAP-TLS provides strong mutual authentication, it requires an organisation to have established a public key infrastructure. This involves deploying their own certificate authority and issuing X.509 certificates, or sourcing them from a commercial certificate authority, for every device that accesses their network. While this introduces additional costs and management overheads, the security advantages are significant.

Control: ISM-1321; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

802.1X with EAP-TLS is used for mutual authentication and key exchange; with all other EAP methods disabled on supplicants and authentication servers.

Control: ISM-1711; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

User identity confidentiality is used if available with EAP-TLS implementations.

Evaluation of 802.1X implementations

The security of 802.1X authentication is dependent on three main elements and how they interact. These three elements include supplicants, authenticators and authentication servers. To provide assurance that these elements have been implemented correctly, they should have completed an evaluation.

Control: ISM-1322; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Evaluated supplicants, authenticators and authentication servers are used for 802.1X authentication implementations.

Generating and issuing X.509 certificates for authentication

When issuing X.509 certificates to devices to access networks, an organisation should be aware that they could be stolen by malicious code. Once compromised, X.509 certificates could be used on other devices to gain unauthorised access to networks. An organisation should also be aware that in only issuing X.509 certificates to devices, any actions taken by human users will only be attributable to specific devices.

When issuing X.509 certificates to human users to access networks, they can either be stored on devices or stored on smart cards. While issuing X.509 certificates that are stored on smart cards provides increased security, it comes at a higher cost. However, human users are more likely to notice missing smart cards and alert their security team, who are then able to revoke their credentials, which can minimise the time malicious actors have access to networks. In addition, to reduce the likelihood of stolen smart cards from being used to gain unauthorised access to networks, multi-factor authentication can be implemented by requiring the use of passwords to access X.509 certificates stored on smart cards. This is particularly important when smart cards grant human users any form of administrative access.

Control: ISM-1323; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

X.509 certificates are required for devices and human users authenticating to networks using 802.1X.

Control: ISM-1324; Revision: 5; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

X.509 certificates are generated using an evaluated certificate authority or hardware security module.

Control: ISM-1327; Revision: 4; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

X.509 certificates are protected by logical and physical access controls and encryption, with those issued to human users requiring authentication before use.

Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service authentication

Separate to the 802.1X authentication process is the RADIUS authentication process that occurs between authenticators and a RADIUS server. RADIUS is what is known as an authentication, authorisation and accounting protocol, and is intended to mediate network access. However, RADIUS is not secure enough to be used without protection. To protect credentials communicated between authenticators and a RADIUS server, communications should be encapsulated with an additional layer of encryption, such as RADIUS over Internet Protocol Security or RADIUS over Transport Layer Security.

Control: ISM-1454; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Communications between authenticators and a RADIUS server are encapsulated with an additional layer of encryption using RADIUS over Internet Protocol Security or RADIUS over Transport Layer Security.

Network management traffic

Implementing security measures specifically for network management traffic provides another layer of defence should malicious actors find an opportunity to connect to networks. In addition, this also makes it more difficult for malicious actors to enumerate networks.

Control: ISM-1006; Revision: 6; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Security measures are implemented to prevent unauthorised access to network management traffic.

Using the Server Message Block protocol

The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is used to share files and printers across networks. Unfortunately, multiple weaknesses exist in SMB version 1 that can be used by malicious actors to gain access to resources on networks, including Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services domain controllers.

Control: ISM-1962; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
SMB version 1 is not used on networks.

Using the Simple Network Management Protocol

The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) can be used to monitor the status of network devices. The first two iterations of SNMP were inherently insecure as they used trivial authentication methods. Furthermore, changing all default SNMP community strings on network devices, and limiting their access to read-only, is strongly encouraged.

Control: ISM-1311; Revision: 3; Updated: Dec-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
SNMP version 1 and SNMP version 2 are not used on networks.

Control: ISM-1312; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
All default SNMP community strings on network devices are changed and write access is disabled.

Using network-based intrusion detection and prevention systems

A network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) or network-based intrusion prevention system (NIPS) can be an effective way of identifying and responding to network intrusions. In addition, generating event logs and alerts for network traffic that contravenes any rule in a firewall ruleset can help identify suspicious or malicious network traffic entering networks due to a failure of, or configuration change to, firewalls.

Control: ISM-1028; Revision: 8; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
A NIDS or NIPS is deployed in gateways between an organisation's networks and other networks they do not manage.

Control: ISM-1030; Revision: 8; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
A NIDS or NIPS is located immediately inside the outermost firewall for gateways and configured to generate event logs and alerts for network traffic that contravenes any rule in a firewall ruleset.

Blocking anonymity network traffic

Inbound network connections from anonymity networks, such as the Tor network, can be used by malicious actors for reconnaissance and malicious code delivery purposes with minimal risk of detection and attribution. As such, this network traffic should be blocked. However, an organisation might choose to support anonymous connections to their websites to cater for individuals who want to remain anonymous

for privacy reasons. In such cases, it is suggested that network traffic from anonymity networks be logged and monitored instead. Additionally, outbound network connections to anonymity networks can be used by malicious code for command and control or data exfiltration purposes and should be blocked.

Control: ISM-1627; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Inbound network connections from anonymity networks are blocked.

Control: ISM-1628; Revision: 0; Updated: Nov-20; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Outbound network connections to anonymity networks are blocked.

Encrypted Domain Name System Services

Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical naming system built on a distributed database for resources connected to the internet. In performing this service, DNS maps human-readable domain names to their associated IP addresses. Unfortunately, malicious actors can surveil standard DNS requests for intelligence gathering. As such, it is important that DNS traffic is suitably encrypted by clients and servers using ASD-approved cryptography, such as via DNS over Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure or DNS over Transport Layer Security.

Control: ISM-2017; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
DNS traffic is encrypted by clients and servers using ASD-approved cryptography.

Protective Domain Name System Services

A protective DNS service can be an effective way of blocking requests made by an organisation's users, or malicious actors on an organisation's network, to known malicious domain names – either as part of an initial compromise or subsequent command and control activities. DNS event logs captured by a protective DNS service can also be useful for investigating any exploitation attempt or successful compromise of a network by malicious actors.

In selecting a protective DNS service, many commercial offerings exist. In addition, ASD offers a free protective DNS service for Australia's most critical systems.

Control: ISM-1782; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
A protective DNS service is used to block access to known malicious domain names.

Network device integrity

Flashing network devices with trusted firmware, obtained from vendors via trusted means, before network devices are used for the first time can assist in reducing cyber supply chain risks, such as the introduction of malicious firmware resulting from a cyber supply chain interdiction attack or a compromised vendor development environment or authoritative source for software. Furthermore, to maintain the ongoing integrity of network devices, their firmware and running configurations should be verified against an approved known-good baseline following patching, on detection of anomalous behaviour and at least monthly. This is especially important for internet-facing network devices.

Control: ISM-1800; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Network devices are flashed with trusted firmware before they are used for the first time.

Control: ISM-2161; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
The integrity of network device firmware and running configurations is verified against an approved known-good baseline following patching, on detection of anomalous behaviour and at least monthly.

Network device hardening

Network devices can come pre-configured with default user accounts and credentials. For example, wireless access points with a user account named 'admin' and a password of 'admin'. Ensuring that default user accounts or credentials are changed, disabled or removed during initial setup can assist in reducing the likelihood of network devices being exploited by malicious actors. Furthermore, any unneeded components, services and functionality of network devices should also be disabled to reduce their attack surface. This is especially important for internet-facing network devices.

Control: ISM-1304; Revision: 7; Updated: Jun-25; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Default user accounts or credentials for network devices, including for any pre-configured user accounts, are changed, disabled or removed during initial setup.

Control: ISM-2162; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Unneeded components, services and functionality of network devices are disabled or removed.

Disabling unused physical ports on network devices

Disabling unused physical ports on network devices reduces the opportunity for malicious actors to connect to networks if they can gain physical access to network devices.

Control: ISM-0534; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Unused physical ports on network devices are disabled.

Regularly restarting network devices

Implementing measures to restart network devices at least monthly can assist in maintaining network device performance as well as removing malicious actors that may have compromised a network device but failed to gain persistence.

Control: ISM-1801; Revision: 1; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Network devices are restarted at least monthly.

Network device event logging

Centrally logging and analysing security-relevant events, including configuration changes, for network devices, especially for internet-facing network devices, can assist in monitoring the security posture of systems, detecting malicious behaviour and contributing to investigations following cyber security incidents.

Control: ISM-1963; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Security-relevant events for internet-facing network devices are centrally logged.

Control: ISM-1964; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-24; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Security-relevant events for non-internet-facing network devices are centrally logged.

Further information

Further information on secure network design can be found in ASD's [Foundations for modern defensible architecture](#) publication.

Further information on wired networks can be found in the 'Wired networks' section of these guidelines.

Further information on wireless networks can be found in the 'Wireless networks' section of these guidelines.

Further information on gateways can be found in the 'Gateways' section of the [Guidelines for gateways](#).

Further information on encrypting communications can be found in the 'Cryptographic fundamentals' section of the [Guidelines for cryptography](#).

Further information on network segmentation and segregation can be found in ASD's [Implementing network segmentation and segregation](#) publication.

Further information on network security zones can be found in Canada's Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's [Baseline security requirements for network security zones \(version 2.0\)](#) publication.

Further information on implementing network segmentation and segregation for system administration purposes can be found in the 'System administration' section of the [Guidelines for system management](#).

Further information on functional separation of servers using virtualisation can be found in the 'Virtualisation hardening' section of the [Guidelines for system hardening](#).

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the 'Cyber supply chain risk management' section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on evaluated products can be found in the 'Evaluated product procurement' section of the [Guidelines for evaluated products](#).

Further information on blocking anonymity network traffic can be found in ASD's [Defending against the malicious use of the Tor network](#) publication.

Further information on DNS services can be found in ASD's [Domain Name System security for domain owners](#) and [Domain Name System security for domain resolvers](#) publications.

Further information on implementing encrypted DNS can be found in the United States' National Security Agency's [Adopting Encrypted DNS in Enterprise Environments](#) publication and the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency's [Encrypted DNS Implementation Guidance](#) publication.

Further information on selecting a protective DNS service can be found in the United States' National Security Agency and Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency's [Selecting a Protective DNS Service](#) publication.

Further information on network device hardening, particularly for internet-facing network devices, can be found in the following publications:

- ASD's [Mitigation strategies for edge devices: Executive guidance](#)
- ASD's [Mitigation strategies for edge devices: Practitioner guidance](#)
- Canada's Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's [Security considerations for edge devices](#)
- United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre's [Guidance on digital forensics and protective monitoring specifications for producers of network devices and appliances](#).

Further information on network device hardening can also be found in the United States' National Security Agency's [Network Infrastructure Security Guide](#) publication.

Further information on event logging can be found in the 'Security monitoring' section of the [Guidelines for security assurance](#).

Further information on event logging for network devices can also be found in ASD's [Priority logs for SIEM ingestion: Practitioner guidance](#) publication.

Wired networks

Context

This section describes security controls applicable to wired networks and extends the 'Network design and configuration' section of these guidelines.

Media Access Control Security

An implementation of Media Access Control Security (MACsec) that fully conforms to its standard must implement at least the GCM-AES-128 cipher suite and may optionally implement the GCM-AES-256, GCM-AES-XPB-128 and GCM-AES-XPB-256 cipher suites, with 256-bit key sizes providing more bits of effective security. These cipher suites may be used to provide only data integrity (integrity-only mode) or both data integrity and data confidentiality (confidentiality protection mode).

Using a connectivity association lifetime of less than 24 hours (86400 seconds) and a secure association lifetime of less than four hours (14400 seconds) can provide a balance between security and usability.

The use of a Pre-Shared Key as a fallback authentication method if EAP-TLS authentication attempts fail can limit the effective strength of the EAP authentication.

For interoperability and maintainability reasons, the GCM-AES-128 and GCM-AES-XPB-128 cipher suites will not be approved beyond 2030.

Control: ISM-2163; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

When using MACsec, confidentiality protection mode is enabled using GCM-AES-128, GCM-AES-256, GCM-AES-XPB-128 or GCM-AES-XPB-256, preferably GCM-AES-256 or GCM-AES-XPB-256.

Control: ISM-2164; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

A connectivity association lifetime of less than 24 hours (86400 seconds) is used for MACsec connections.

Control: ISM-2165; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

When using EAP-TLS, each device performs a fresh EAP-TLS authentication each time a new Connectivity Association Key is required.

Control: ISM-2166; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

A secure association lifetime of less than four hours (14400 seconds) is used for MACsec connections.

Control: ISM-2167; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

The use of a Pre-Shared Key as a fallback authentication method for MACsec is disabled.

Further information

Further information on encrypting communications can be found in the 'Cryptographic fundamentals' section of the [Guidelines for cryptography](#).

Further information on 802.1X authentication and key exchange can be found in the 'Network design and configuration' section of these guidelines.

Wireless networks

Context

This section describes security controls applicable to wireless networks and extends the 'Network design and configuration' section of these guidelines.

Choosing wireless devices

Using wireless devices, such as wireless access points, wireless adapters and wireless network cards, which have been certified against a Wi-Fi Alliance certification program, provides an organisation with the assurance that they conform to wireless standards and are guaranteed to be interoperable with other wireless devices on wireless networks.

Control: ISM-1314; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
All wireless devices are Wi-Fi Alliance certified.

Public wireless networks

When an organisation provides a public wireless network for public use, connecting the public wireless network to, or sharing infrastructure with, any other organisation networks can create an entry point for malicious actors enabling them to target organisation networks to steal data or disrupt services.

Control: ISM-0536; Revision: 8; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Public wireless networks provided for public use are segregated from all other organisation networks.

Administrative interfaces for wireless access points

Administrative interfaces allow users to modify the configuration and security settings of wireless access points. Often, by default, wireless access points allow users to access administrative interfaces over fixed network connections or wireless network connections. To assist in reducing the attack surface for wireless access points, the administrative interface should be disabled for wireless network connections.

Control: ISM-1315; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
The administrative interface on wireless access points is disabled for wireless network connections.

Default settings

Some wireless access points come pre-configured with weak default settings. As such, it is important to harden the settings of wireless access points prior to their deployment in networks. In addition, some wireless access points come with default Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs). As default SSIDs are often documented on the internet, it is important to change default SSIDs of wireless access points.

When changing default SSIDs, it is important that new SSIDs do not bring undue attention to an organisation's wireless networks. In doing so, SSIDs of wireless networks should not be readily associated with an organisation, the location of their premises or the functionality of wireless networks.

A method commonly recommended to lower the profile of wireless networks is disabling SSID broadcasting. While this ensures that the existence of wireless networks is not broadcast overtly using beacon frames, SSIDs are still broadcast in probe requests, probe responses, association requests and re-association requests. As such, it is easy to determine SSIDs of wireless networks by capturing these

requests and responses. By disabling SSID broadcasting, an organisation will make it more difficult for human users to connect to wireless networks. Furthermore, malicious actors could configure a malicious wireless access point to broadcast the same SSID as a hidden SSID used by a legitimate wireless network, fooling human users into connecting, or devices into automatically connecting, to the malicious wireless access point instead. In doing so, malicious actors could steal authentication credentials to gain access to the legitimate wireless network.

Control: ISM-1710; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Settings for wireless access points are hardened.

Control: ISM-1316; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Default SSIDs of wireless access points are changed.

Control: ISM-1317; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
SSIDs of non-public wireless networks are not readily associated with an organisation, the location of their premises or the functionality of wireless networks.

Control: ISM-1318; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
SSID broadcasting is not disabled on wireless access points.

Media Access Control address filtering

Devices that connect to wireless networks generally have a unique Media Access Control (MAC) address. Using MAC address filtering can prevent rogue devices from connecting to wireless networks. However, malicious actors may be able to determine MAC addresses of legitimate devices and use this information to gain access to wireless networks. As such, MAC address filtering introduces management overhead without any tangible security benefit.

Control: ISM-1320; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
MAC address filtering is not used to restrict which devices can connect to wireless networks.

Static addressing

Assigning static IP addresses for devices accessing wireless networks can prevent rogue devices connecting to wireless networks from being assigned routable IP addresses. However, malicious actors may be able to determine IP addresses of legitimate devices and use this information to gain access to wireless networks. As such, configuring devices to use static IP addresses introduces management overhead without any tangible security benefit.

Control: ISM-1319; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Static addressing is not used for assigning IP addresses on wireless networks.

Confidentiality and integrity of wireless network traffic

As wireless networks are often capable of being accessed from outside the perimeter of secured spaces, all wireless network traffic requires suitable cryptographic protection. For this purpose, it is recommended that Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) be used as it provides equivalent or greater security than Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2). WPA3 has also prohibited the use of various outdated and insecure cipher suites.

WPA3-Enterprise supports three enterprise modes of operation: enterprise only mode, transition mode and 192-bit mode. Preference is given to WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit mode as this mode ensures no

cryptographic algorithms with known weaknesses are used. However, if any other WPA3-Enterprise modes are used then Authentication and Key Management suite 00-0F-AC:1 should be disabled (if this option is available).

Control: ISM-1332; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit mode is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of all wireless network traffic.

Caching 802.1X authentication outcomes

When 802.1X authentication is used as part of WPA3-Enterprise, a shared secret key known as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is generated upon successful authentication of devices. This PMK is then capable of being cached to assist with fast roaming between wireless access points. For example, when devices roam away from wireless access points they have authenticated to, they will not need to perform a full re-authentication should they roam back while the cached PMK remains valid. To further assist with roaming, wireless access points can be configured to pre-authenticate devices to neighbouring wireless access points that devices might roam to. Although requiring full authentication for devices each time they roam between wireless access points is ideal, an organisation can choose to use PMK caching and pre-authentication if they have a business requirement for fast roaming. If PMK caching is used, the PMK caching period should not be set to greater than 1440 minutes (24 hours).

Control: ISM-1330; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
The PMK caching period is not set to greater than 1440 minutes (24 hours).

Fast Basic Service Set Transition

The WPA3 standard specifies support for Fast Basic Service Set Transition (FT) (802.11r). FT is a feature designed to improve user mobility and combat lag introduced by the need to authenticate to each wireless access point. However, FT requires authenticators to request and send keys to other authenticators within a security domain. If any of these keys are intercepted, all security properties are lost. Therefore, it is imperative that communications are appropriately secured. As such, FT should be disabled unless it can be confirmed that authenticator-to-authenticator communications are secured by a suitable ASD-Approved Cryptographic Protocol that provides confidentiality, integrity and mutual authentication.

Control: ISM-1712; Revision: 1; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
The use of FT (802.11r) is disabled unless authenticator-to-authenticator communications are secured by an ASD-Approved Cryptographic Protocol.

Interference between wireless networks

When wireless networks are deployed in proximity, there is the potential for interference to impact their availability, especially when operating on commonly used 802.11b/g (2.4 GHz) default channels of 1 and 11. Sufficiently separating wireless networks by using frequency separation can help reduce this security risk. This can be achieved by using wireless networks that are configured to operate on channels that minimise overlapping frequencies, such as using 802.11b/g (2.4 GHz) channels and 802.11n (5 GHz) channels. It is important to note though, if implementing a mix of 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz channels, not all devices may be compatible with 802.11n and able to connect to 5 GHz channels.

Control: ISM-1334; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Wireless networks implement sufficient frequency separation from other wireless networks.

Protecting management frames on wireless networks

An effective denial-of-service attack can be performed by exploiting unprotected management frames using inexpensive commercial hardware. The 802.11 standard provides no protection for management frames and therefore does not protect against spoofing or denial-of-service attacks. However, the 802.11w amendment specifically addresses the protection of management frames on wireless networks and should be enabled for WPA2. In WPA3, this feature is built into the standard.

Control: ISM-1335; Revision: 1; Updated: Sep-18; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Wireless access points enable the use of the 802.11w amendment to protect management frames.

Wireless network footprint

Instead of deploying a small number of wireless access points that broadcast on high power, a greater number of wireless access points that use less broadcast power can be deployed to achieve the desired footprint for wireless networks. This has the benefit of providing service continuity should wireless access points become unserviceable. In such cases, the output power of nearby wireless access points can be increased to cover the footprint gap until the unserviceable wireless access points can be replaced.

In addition to minimising the output power of wireless access points to reduce the footprint of wireless networks, the use of radio frequency (RF) shielding can be used for an organisation's facilities. While expensive, this will limit wireless communications to areas under the control of an organisation. RF shielding on an organisation's facilities also has the added benefit of preventing the jamming of wireless networks from outside of the facilities in which wireless networks are operating.

Control: ISM-1338; Revision: 2; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Instead of deploying a small number of wireless access points that broadcast on high power, a greater number of wireless access points that use less broadcast power are deployed to achieve the desired footprint for wireless networks.

Control: ISM-1013; Revision: 6; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

The effective range of wireless communications outside an organisation's area of control is limited by implementing RF shielding on facilities in which SECRET or TOP SECRET wireless networks are used.

Further information

Further information on [Wi-Fi technologies and associated testing and certification programs](#) is available from the Wi-Fi Alliance.

Further information on encrypting communications can be found in the 'Cryptographic fundamentals' section of the [Guidelines for cryptography](#).

Further information on 802.1X authentication and key exchange can be found in the 'Network design and configuration' section of these guidelines.

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the 'Cyber supply chain risk management' section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on evaluated products can be found in the 'Evaluated product procurement' section of the [Guidelines for evaluated products](#).

Service continuity for online services

Cloud-based hosting of online services

Using cloud service providers can enable an organisation to build highly resilient online services due to the increased computing resources, bandwidth and multiple separate physical sites made available by cloud service providers. An organisation can attempt to achieve the same results using their own infrastructure; however, doing so may require significant upfront costs and may still result in a limited capability to scale resources dynamically to meet genuine spikes in demand. In cases of denial-of-service attacks, cloud-based hosting can also provide segregation from self-hosted or other cloud-hosted services ensuring that other systems, such as email, are not affected.

Control: ISM-1437; Revision: 5; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Cloud service providers are used for hosting online services.

Capacity and availability planning and monitoring for online services

It is important that connectivity between an organisation and their cloud service providers meets requirements for bandwidth, latency and availability. In support of this, an organisation and their cloud service providers should discuss the ability to scale resources dynamically in response to genuine spikes in demand. This should include any authorised activities that can be undertaken to verify measures implemented to support such requirements, especially where high availability is required. For example, an organisation and their cloud service providers may discuss whether dedicated communication links or internet connections will be used, and whether secondary communications links will provide sufficient capacity to maintain operational requirements if the primary communication link becomes unavailable.

Furthermore, capacity and availability monitoring should be performed to manage workloads and monitor the health of online services. This can be achieved through continuous real-time monitoring of metrics, such as latency, jitter, packet loss, throughput and availability. In addition, feedback should be provided to cloud service providers when performance does not meet service level agreement targets. To assist with this, anomaly detection can be performed through network telemetry that is integrated into security monitoring tools.

Control: ISM-1579; Revision: 3; Updated: Jun-26; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Cloud service providers' ability to scale resources dynamically in response to genuine spikes in demand is discussed and verified as part of capacity and availability planning for online services.

Control: ISM-1580; Revision: 1; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Where a high availability requirement exists for online services, the services are architected to automatically transition between availability zones.

Control: ISM-1581; Revision: 3; Updated: Jun-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Continuous real-time monitoring of the capacity and availability of online services is performed.

Using content delivery networks

Similar to cloud-based hosting, the use of content delivery networks (CDNs) can allow an organisation to create highly resilient online services by leveraging the large bandwidth, geographically dispersed hosting locations, traffic scrubbing and other security controls offered by CDNs.

The use of CDNs is particularly effective when serving static bandwidth intensive media, such as images, sound or video files. However, the services offered by CDNs can include more than basic content hosting, such as web response caching, load balancing, web application security and denial-of-service attack mitigations.

In using CDNs, care should be taken with their configuration to ensure that the IP addresses of an organisation's web servers (referred to as origin servers) are not identifiable by malicious actors, as knowledge of origin server IP addresses could allow for protections provided by CDNs to be bypassed. Additionally, appropriate security controls should be applied to only enable communication between origin servers, CDNs and authorised management networks.

Control: ISM-1438; Revision: 2; Updated: Dec-21; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Where a high availability requirement exists for website hosting, CDNs that cache websites are used.

Control: ISM-1439; Revision: 3; Updated: Mar-22; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
If using CDNs, disclosing the IP addresses of web servers under an organisation's control (referred to as origin servers) is avoided and access to the origin servers is restricted to the CDNs and authorised management networks.

Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies

Denial-of-service attacks are designed to disrupt or degrade online services, such as website, email and Domain Name System services. To achieve this goal, malicious actors may use multiple methods to deny access to legitimate users of online services. This includes using multiple computers to direct a large volume of unwanted network traffic at online services to consume all available network bandwidth, using multiple computers to direct tailored network traffic at online services to consume all processing resources, or hijacking online services to redirect legitimate users away from those services to other services that malicious actors control.

As an organisation often cannot avoid being targeted by denial-of-service attacks, they should discuss with their cloud service providers any denial-of-service attack detection and monitoring services that may be available for their use. For example, reporting dashboards that provide out-of-band and real-time alerts based on organisation-defined notification thresholds. Furthermore, an organisation should discuss with their cloud service providers what mitigation strategies they can implement to prepare for, and reduce the impact of, being targeted by a denial-of-service attack. Finally, with the express consent of their cloud service providers, an organisation may seek to test the effectiveness of any denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies that have been implemented.

Overall, preparing for denial-of-service attacks before they occur, such as by identifying critical online services and implementing preventative denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies, is by far the best approach as it is very difficult to respond to denial-of-service attacks once they begin and efforts at that stage are unlikely to be effective.

Control: ISM-1431; Revision: 5; Updated: Jun-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A
Denial-of-service attack mitigation strategies are discussed with cloud service providers, specifically:

- *their capacity to withstand denial-of-service attacks*
- *costs likely to be incurred as a result of denial-of-service attacks*
- *availability monitoring and thresholds for notification of denial-of-service attacks*
- *thresholds for turning off any online services or functionality during denial-of-service attacks*

- *pre-approved actions that can be undertaken during denial-of-service attacks*
- *any arrangements with upstream service providers to block malicious network traffic as far upstream as possible.*

Control: ISM-1436; Revision: 3; Updated: Jun-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Critical online services are segregated from other online services that are more likely to be targeted as part of denial-of-service attacks.

Control: ISM-1432; Revision: 3; Updated: Jun-23; Applicable: NC, OS, P, S, TS; Essential 8: N/A

Domain names for online services are protected via registrar locking and confirming that domain registration details are correct.

Further information

Further information on cyber supply chain risk management can be found in the 'Cyber supply chain risk management' section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on the use of cloud service providers can be found in the 'Managed services and cloud services' section of the [Guidelines for procurement and outsourcing](#).

Further information on business continuity and disaster recovery planning can be found in the 'Chief information security officer' section of the [Guidelines for cyber security roles](#).

Further information on mitigating denial-of-service attacks can be found in ASD's [Preparing for and responding to denial-of-service attacks](#) publication.

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